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1. INTRODUCTION decentralized and democratic countries (Chalid, 
After the resignation of former President 2005). The main goals of that transformation 
Soeharto in 1998, Indonesia started an ambitious areadvancing people's welfare and creating better 
program called decentralization. By establishing economic conditions (Ministry of Finance, 
Law No.22/1999 concerning Local Government 2009). 
which has been replaced by Law No.32/2004 Based on the laws, one of the important 
(First Revision: Government Regulation in Lieu functions mandated to local governments of 
1of Law No. 3/2005 ; Second Revision: Law No. Indonesia is promoting economic development, 
212/2008 ) and Law No.25/1999 concerning which is consistent with the theory that said 
Fiscal Balance between Central and Local decentralization generates rapid economic 
Government which has been replaced by Law development. Davoodi and Zou (1998) also 
No.33/2004, Indonesia has tried to transform stated that decentralization, the process of 
from one of the world's most authoritarian and transferring political and administrative power to 
centralized countries to one of the most lower level governments, has improved 
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The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of regional regulation on economic performance in 
Indonesia. This study uses a panel data set of 31 Provinces in Indonesia during the period of 2002 to 2009 
and applies fixed effect method for its estimation. In order to provide better explanation, this study also 
utilize three proxies of regional regulation variables, namely the number of regional regulations, the 
number of revoked regional regulations, and ratio of the revoked regional regulations to the existing 
regional regulations.
The result of this study shows that regional regulation negatively affects economic performance. 
However, the coefficient of regional regulation is insignificant. In general, it can be concluded that there 
is not enough evidence to claim that regional regulation affect economic performance. Still, by 
classifying regions into two groups, rich and poor regions, the significant effect of regional regulation on 
economic development varies.
Keywords: Regional regulation, Economic performance, Decentralization, Panel data
1 2Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 3/2005 changed Law No.12/2008 changed the substitutions of Law No. 
the substations of Law No. 32/2004 regarding the regional 32/2004 regarding the duty and authority of the deputy of the 
election. head of region and regional legislature, and the regional 
election.
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economic efficiency and augmented growth rate by the local governments (Yuntho, 2012). 
4at regional and national level. According to Indrawati  (2009), there were 9,714 
In contrast to the theory, the implementation regulations that have been issued by local 
of decentralization is not always in accordance governments from 2002 to 2009. However, from 
with its grand design since it is a complicated the total of those regulations, 3,455 regional 
phenomenon and characterized by various regulations (36%) have been revoked by the 
aspects at different levels (Iimi, 2004). The main central government because most of those 
problems of the implementation of decentra- regulations violated the general principle of the 
lization are not only from the central government establishment of regulations.
side, such as the lack of regulations and guide- There are two different arguments related to 
lines and the reluctance of some ministries to the implication of revocations of regional 
distribute their authorities, but also from the local regulation on the economy. The supporters of 
governments side, such as the lack qualified revocation say that revocations are necessary 
human resources in the bureaucracy, low capacity since those regulations set higher tariffs on taxes 
of local legislatives members, and lack of funding and levies than the central government does and 
sources to support their development projects or also create new varieties of taxes and levies. 
high dependence on central government Charging high tariffs and creating many kinds of 
subsidies (Rasyid, 2002). Regarding the taxes and levies may impose high economic costs 
decentralization manuals or guidelines, USAID on investment, and also can be a barrier for 
(2009) also reported that the obstacles in entrepreneurs to start businesses (Monitoring 
implementing decentralization are unclear Committee of Regional Autonomy Implemen-
guidance and legislation, which did not regulate tation, 2012). Consequently, investors will prefer 
the new mandate (decentralization) specifically other regions which offer lower cost for doing 
or provide technical guidance about sharing business, then the income of those regions will be 
authority and responsibility among local, deteriorate.
provincial, and national government. In contrast, the opposers, most of whom are 
In order to overcome the difficulties of legal experts, argued that revocations will create 
decentralization implementation, some local recht-vacuum or legal vacuum and generate 
governments have taken several actions. uncertainty in economic situations. It is also a 
Reforming bureaucracy, upgrading the unqua- sign of the inefficiency of the rule of law, 
lified officers, and providing good infrastructure especially for investors (Rajaguguk, 2003). 
are the focuses of some local governments for Those situations can cause hesitation among 
spurring economic development at several recent local and foreign investors to invest in a particular 
years (Chalid, 2005). However, one of the most sector in a region which is graded as a moderate-
popular actions taken by local governments is high level risk investment (Schwark, 2009). 
issuing additional regulations to clarify the role of Finally, such a lack of investment can decelerate 
decentralization in promoting regional income the development of local economy. 
3 Although there are debates among experts (Zuhro, 2013) .
related to the revocations of regional regulations, The trends of issuing regional regulations 
there are no empirical studies trying to explore have made the number of regional regulations 
the relationship between the revocations of increase rapidly. Local governments seem to be 
regional regulation on economy. Many studies competing in making regulations in order to 
related to this topic only focus on the field of law execute their larger authorities. It has been noted 
instead of the field of empirical economics. that 14,000 regional regulations has been issued 
3 4Interviewed by Bali Post. Sri Mulyani Indrawati is Former Minister of Finance - 
Siti Zuhro is Senior Researcher at The Center for  Political Republic of Indonesia (2005-2010). Managing Director of 
Studies – Indonesian Institute of Science World bank Group (2010-present)
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Those studies explore the legal matters of a two kind of funds, regional autonomous subsidy 
regulation's establishment, and prevention action (SDO) and presidential instruction funds 
to control revocations. For instance, the study (INPRES). It means that local governments had 
conducted by Isrok (2009) only discusses about no independency on organizing their budget. In 
legal matters rather than economics. addition to that, local government did not get 
On account of the different arguments share of their natural resources which were 
regarding regulation revocations and the lack of exploited by central government. Those 
studies related to the impact of regulations on mechanisms showed that the role of central 
economy, this study intends to investigate government still prominent (World Bank, 2003).
whether the revocation of regional regulations After the demission of former President 
will improve or impede economic performance in Soeharto, Indonesia started to change its 
Indonesia. I also try to examine how significant centralized system into decentralized system. 
revocation affects economic performance and The changing of the system was intended to 
determine other factors that can be accelerators of prevent national disintegration as a result of 
economic performance in particular region. economic and political crises that happen in 1998 
Furthermore, this study is expected to serve (Usui and Alisjahbana, 2005; World Bank, 2003). 
as a more comprehensive analysis on the By enacting Law No.22/1999 to resolve regional 
implementation of decentralization programs administration problems and reformulate the 
related to regional economic performance. This system of decentralization and Law No. 25/1999 
study is also expected to give useful information to introduce the decentralized system regarding 
and policy recommendation that can support the fiscal balance system between central and 
Indonesian central government in accelerating local governments, Indonesia tried to correct the 
the realization of local economy independency. problems from the implementation of foregoing 
laws. Furthermore, Law No.22/1999 granted 
broader authority to local government regarding 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
public goods and services in 11 sectors such as 2.1. The Implementation of Decentralization 
public work, health, education and culture, in Indonesia 
agriculture, transportation, trade and industry, Brief history of decentralization in Indonesia
investment, environment, land, cooperation, and The era of decentralization in Indonesia 
5labor force services . Whereas some sectors such begun by the implementation of Law No.22/1999 
as foreign policy, defense, security, judicial, concerning Local Government and Law 
monetary and fiscal policy, and religion are under No.25/1999 concerning Fiscal Balance between 
6the central government authority . In addition, Central and Local Government. These laws have 
Law No.25/1999 introduces general allocation made significant changes on the interregional 
funds (DAU) and specific allocation funds relations by changing Indonesia from implemen-
(DAK) to reduce the gap of fiscal capacity ting centralized system to decentralized system 
between regions (Brodjonegoro, 2005; World (World Bank, 2003). 
Bank, 2003).Prior to those laws, Indonesia implemented 
Due to confusion among local government centralized system on its intergovernmental 
regarding the ambiguousness of the mandates interactions, although central government tried to 
assigned (Sidik, 2007) and the innacurate use of adopt decentralized system on Law No.32/1956 
budget (Ahmad and Mansoor, 2002), central by transferring some authority of collecting 
government replaced Law No.22/1999 by Law taxes, such as land tax, land product tax, 
No.32/2004 concerning Local Government (this household tax, vehicle tax, road tax, slaughter 
law was revised twice. First revision is tax, copra tax, and construction tax, and giving 
5 Article 11, verse 2 Law No.22/1999
6 Article 7, verse 1 Law No.22/1999
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Government Regulation in Lieu of Law regulations to clarify the role of decentralization 
No.3/2005, and second revision is Law in promoting economic growth (regional income) 
7No.12/2008) and Law No. 25/1999 by Law (Zuhro, 2013) . 
No.33/2004 concerning Fiscal Balance between 
Central and Local Government. The new laws 2.2. The Revocation of Regional Regulation
brought several improvements in administrative Legal aspect and Mechanism of Revocation
and fiscal function on intergovernmental The trends of issuing regional regulations 
relations. Law No.32/2004 explains more have made the proliferation of regional regula-
specific about authority distribution from central tions. Local governments seem to be competing 
government to local government and the in making regulations in order to execute their 
interregional connection and also provides the larger authorities. It has been noted that 14,000 
possibilities of citizen to participate in regional regional regulations has been issued by the local 
development planning process.  governments (Yuntho, 2012).
 Furthermore, Law No.33/2004 also contains According to Minister of Finance, from the 
improvement in terms of fiscal balance in period 2002 to 2009, there were 9,714 regulations 
intergovernmental relations. Based on this law, issued by local governments. However, from the 
decentralization, deconcentration, and co- total of those regulations, 3,455 regional 
administration are the fundamental bases of regulations (36%) have been revoked by the 
intergovernmental fiscal relations. This law also central government because those laws violated 
introduces revenue sharing mechanism from the the general principle of the establishment of 
exploitation of natural resource and income tax. regulations. The first place was taken by East 
Other improvements that resulted from Law No. Java (272 regulations), then North Sumatera (247 
33/2004 are the new formulation of DAU and regulations), Central Java (202 regulations), West 
DAK, and the introduction of local bond. Java (174 regulations), and East Kalimantan (168 
During the implementation of decentrali- regulations).
zation, there were several obstacles came from In Indonesia, the revocation of regional 
central government and local government side. regulations by the central government shows that 
Rasyid (2002) stated that the problems, from many regional regulations are in disagreement 
with The Establishment of Regulatory Law central government side, are the lack of clear 
No.10/2004.  Law No.10/2004 provided the regulations as technical guidelines and also the 
general principle of the establishment of reluctance of some ministries to transfer some of 
regulation as guidance on establishing law, such their authorities in order to execute decentrali-
as the principle of clarity of objectives, the zation, whereas, from local government side, are 
principle of institutional basis and appropriate low qualification officers in the bureaucracy, 
officials, the principle of conformity of type, incapability of local legislature in creating 
hierarchy, and substances, the principle of useful regional laws, and high dependency on central 
and profitable, the principle of clarity syntheses, government subsidies.
and the principle of transparency. Furthermore, To solve the problems of the implementation 
Article 7 verse 1 Law No.10/2004 provides a of decentralization, there were several actions 
hierarchy of laws in Indonesia as follows: The taken by local government, such as reforming the 
1945 Constitution; Law/Government Regulation bureaucracy, upgrading the unqualified officers, 
in Lieu of Law; Government Regulation; and providing good infrastructure (Chalid, 2005). 
Presidential Regulation; and Regional Besides, one of the most popular actions taken by 
Regulation. Legally, each type of law must not local governments is issuing additional 
7 Interviewed by Bali Post.
Siti Zuhro is Senior Researcher at The Center for  Political 
Studies – Indonesian Institute of Science
18
conflict or contradict with any law higher than its Ministry of Home Affair also have an authority to 
own type in the hierarchy, and a law can amend or review the regulation called executive review in 
revoke a lower law than its own type in the the forms of preventive and repressive control. 
hierarchy. Once it contradicts the higher law, The Central Government will do preventive 
regional regulation is susceptible to being supervision regarding the draft of budget 
overridden by law, government regulation or legislation, local taxes and levies, and Urban 
presidential regulation, all of which are higher on Land use Plan. Furthermore, the repressive 
the hierarchy.  control will be conducted to all regulations made 
In addition, based on the theory, the by the local governments, including the 
enactment and implementation of regulation regulations that on preventive supervision. Thus, 
should follow the eight principles of procedural it is possible to have two kinds of control for one 
morality in legislation which introduced by regulation. While judicial review focuses only on 
Fuller in 1964 (Murphy, 2005), such as the laws legal basis (contradiction to higher regulation), 
must be general, the laws must be published executive review checks the regulation not only 
(promulgated), the laws  must be prospective (not based on the rule of law, but also based on the 
retro-prospective), the laws must be intelligible public interest standard. The public interest is 
(clear), the laws must non-contradictory, the laws more sociological aspects rather than legalistic. 
must be possible to be complied, the rules must be So testing against the public interest depends on a 
constant (not relatively easy to be changed), and whole range of aspects of the enforceability of 
there must be a congruency between the declared laws and social norms in the society. 
and published laws and the actions of responsible 
officials on its enforcement. Debate about the revocations of regional 
As a legal instrument of state, regional regulation
regulations can be reviewed. The regional There are debates among experts related to 
regulations that are contrary to the public interest the effect of the revocation of regional regulation 
and / or contrary to the higher regulation can be on the economy. The bureaucrats, who support 
reviewed by two institutions, namely Supreme the revocation, argued that revocations are 
Court and Central Government through Ministry necessary because the implementation of those 
of Home Affairs. The review conducted by regulations will increase the cost of doing 
Supreme Court is judicial review, while by the business in its region. The high cost of doing 
Government through Ministry of Home Affairs is business in provinces is caused by the higher 
executive review. tariffs on taxes and levies and the new varieties of 
In performing their authority, the Supreme taxes and levies which were set on the regional 
Court is passive. The Supreme Court only wait regulations. That condition can be an obstacle for 
for the request of group of people or an individual the entrepreneur to invest (Monitoring 
petition containing objections to the enactment of Committee of Regional Autonomy Implemen-
a legislation which is allegedly contrary to tation, 2012). Thus, investors will divert their 
legislation filed to higher levels. When the business destination to other regions which offer 
regulations is contrary to higher regulation and / lower cost for investment. On the other hand, 
or its establishment does not meet the applicable legal experts argued that revocations will create 
provisions, the Supreme Court granted the recht-vacuum or legal vacuum and generate 
petition and ordered the Local Government uncertainty in economic situations. Revocation is 
together with the legislature to repeal the law also a cue of the inefficiency of the rule of law, 
within a period of 90 days. This decision cannot especially for investors (Rajaguguk, 2003). 
be raised a review. Because of those conditions, investors will 
Conversely, on behalf of Central Govern- hesitate to invest their money in a particular 
sector in a region which is graded as a moderate-ment, several ministries under the coordination of 
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high level risk investment (Schwark, 2009). Where: Y is output; L is labor; A is 
Finally, the lack of investment can decelerate the technology; s  is capital accumulation; n is k
economic development of those regions.  growth rate of labor;  is advancement of 
Although there are debates among experts knowledge;   is rate of depreciation; h* is human 
related to the revocations of regional regulations, capital; and t is time. 
there are no empirical studies trying to explore Furthermore, this study adopts the 
the relationship between the revocations of augmented Solow growth model for sub national/ 
regional regulation on economic performance. regional level analysis rather than cross country 
Studies related to this topic only focus on the field analysis.
of law instead of the field of empirical economics. 
Those studies explore the legal matters of a 3.2. Empirical Issues
regulation’s establishment, and prevention action Regarding the application of sub national 
to control revocations. For instance, the study model in particular country's studies, there are 
conducted by Isrok (2009) only discusses about some additional consideration related to the 
legal matters rather than economics. availability of data, the impact of national policy, 
Because of the different arguments provided and interregional interaction (Vidyattama, 2007). 
by experts, and also the lack of studies related to However, the concern of this study is only the 
the impact of regulations on economy, this study data availability since it is assumed that during 
will focus on the effect of the revocation of the period 2002 to 2009 there were not any 
regional regulation to Indonesia's economic national policies that had significant effects on 
performance at sub national level. This study is the economy excluding decentralization program 
expected to provide empirical results to explain itself, and this study will not analyze the 
whether the revocations of regional regulations comparison between the economic condition 
improve or impede economic performance in before and after decentralization is implemented. 
Indonesia. The interregional interaction is not discussed in 
this study because of the limitations of the data.
3. RESEARCH METHOD In addition to several considerations, there 
3.1. Theoretical Model are some advantages in employing the empirical 
The model of this study is built based on framework in regional data particularly in 
augmented Solow model, which was introduced Indonesia studies. Since the source of most 
by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil in 1992. By adding regional data in Indonesia is collected by the 
human capital accounting to the Solow growth Indonesian Central Board of Statistics (BPS), 
model, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil tried to provide there will be no varying variables in terms of 
a better explanation for the variation in the definition, method of collection and calculation, 
standard of living across regions. They show that and the data among regions in one particular 
steady state income per capita depends on the rate period are comparable, for example variable 
of investment in physical capital, the rate of income. Moreover, having several proxies for 
population growth, and the level of human income in sub national level studies is possible 
capital, as follows: since the definition of income is same and the 
collection and calculation process are similar. 
Conversely, it might be difficult in the case of 
cross country analysis due to different methods or 
processes for collecting data, and also different 
ways of income distribution (Vidyattama, 2007). 
In addition to the similarities in definitions 
and collecting process, Vidyattama (2007) stated 
that there are two advantages in applying sub 
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national frameworks related to empirical issues. provinces will be examined in this study and the 
First, there is more justification to impose augmented Solow model by Mankiw, Romer, and 
coefficient homogeneity than in cross country Weil (1992) will be adopted. The adopted model 
studies. This means it can be expected that the in this research can be expressed as
impact of particular growth determinant is more 
uniform within one country than between 
countries (cross countries). Second, in the case of 
Indonesia, income per capita data are dynamic 
since it is always fluctuating not only for five 
yearly but also annually. Where:
     : is income (GRDP) per capita in 
3.3. Data province i at time t, 
The data used in this study is a panel data set : is initial income (GRDP) per capita or 
of 31 Provinces in Indonesia during the period of lag income per capita in province i at time 
2002 to 2009. The data are obtained from several t, 
institutions such as the Ministry of Finance, : is physical capital or gross capital 
Central Bodies of Statistic, Ministry of Home accumulation in province i at time t, 
Affairs, and United Nation Development : is human capital in province i at time t,
Program (Provincial Governance Strengthening : is labor force  in province i at time t, 
Program as a collaborative program between : is regional regulation in province i at 
UNDP and Government of Indonesia). Due to time t,
lack of provincial data from two provinces in the : is error term
period of 2002 until 2009, this study only uses 31 The model shows that the income per capita 
out of 33 Provinces. Lack of data from two is affected by the previous year's income per 
provinces, Kepulauan Riau and Sulawesi Barat, capita, investment, human capital, and regional 
occurred because they just established in 2002 regulation. The provincial income/ GRDP per 
and 2004 consecutively. To create balanced panel capita (Y), as dependent variable, is measured by 
data, the data of Kepulauan Riau and Sulawesi dividing gross regional domestic product 
Barat are combined in the data of its origin (GRDP) (constant price) from 2002 to 2009 in 
provinces. This treatment has already been used each provinces to total population in each 
by Indrawati (2008), and Beta (2009), in order to provinces. Per capital GRDP here is in million 
tackle the incompleteness of provincial data in rupiah. This variable shows the provincial 
Indonesia. income to capture the effect of regional 
The panel data set starts from 2002 because regulation. GRDP demonstrates the amount of 
the complete data of the variables of interest, products in the form of goods and services 
which is revoked regional regulation, is only produced by the production units within the 
available from 2002 to 2009. The revoked boundary of a province. Produced goods, which 
regional regulation data are obtained and included capital goods, have not been 
consolidated from Ministry of Finance depreciated. Hence, the amount obtained from 
(Directorate General Fiscal and Balance) and the GRDP is based on a gross level. Economic 
Ministry of Home Affairs (Directorate General performance of a region (province) can be 
Regional Autonomy).  determined by looking at how much output or 
income region is reflected in the value of Gross 
3.4. Empirical Model Regional Domestic Product (GRDP). Although it 
In order to investigate the impact of regional is not a good indicator, the welfare of the people 
regulation on regional economic performance in seen from economic aspect can be measured by 
Indonesia, the economic performance across national income per capita. (Hamrullah, 2012).
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The initial income per capita or lag income that were revoked by central government in a 
per capita (Y ) is measured by the previous year's particular province in a specific year (Revoked it-ô
RR). Third, Regional Regulation is measured by provincial level GRDP. The one year time 
the ratio of revoked regional regulations to the difference is indicated by Y instead of Y , since it-ô it-1
regional regulations (Ratio Revoked RR). By it might be possible to take any yearly time 
defining three proxies of Regional Regulation, difference to capture the impact of that variable 
this study is expected to give empirical evidence that could be happened after only a few years. In a 
of the effects of regional regulation on economic study conducted by Beta (2009), five-yearly time 
perfor-mance. Furthermore, three methods difference of GRDP is used. However, due to the 
contai-ning Pooled Least Square, Fixed Effect short time range of the available data, this study 
and Random Effect are applied to analyze the only uses one year time difference of GRDP.
relationship.Labor force (L) is measured by the number of 
labor force in particular provinces. Labor force 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONcan be used as a control variable to explain 
The objective of this chapter is to present the economic performance, since in the process of 
empirical evidence regarding the relationship production; it will lead to the increases of output 
between regional regulations and economic (Zhang & Zou, 2001). Thus, labor force is 
performance in Indonesia. This chapter is divided expected to have a positive correlation with 
into three sections. First section present the basic economic performance.
relationship between regional regulation as the Zhang and Zou (1998) defined variable 
Interest variable and economic performance as investment as the share of fixed capital 
dependent variable. By adding other variables accumulation and circulating funds to provincial 
that determine economic perfor-mance, second income. However, since the data of circulating 
section present more comprehensive explanation funds at sub national level is not available in 
about the role of regional regulation to the Indonesia, this study only uses the share of gross 
economic performance. After conducting Chow fixed capital formation to provincial income as a 
Test, Hausman Test and Breusch Pagan LM Test, proxy of Investment (I). The relationship 
the third section presents the examination of between investment and income is expected to be 
variation of the effect of regional regulation positive relations since increase in fixedh assets 
among regions.will lead to increase in capital stock, then as a part 
of production factors, it also will increase output. 
Basic relationship between regional regulation Human capital (H) is from Human 
and economic performanceDevelopment Index (HDI). HDI developed by 
Before analyzing the relationship between UNDP is a composite index which covers three 
regional regulations and economic performance areas of human development that are comprised 
of local governments, three proxies of regional of critical lifespan, knowledge, and decent living 
regulation are introduced as the interest variables, standards. The higher of HDI is expected better 
RR, Revoked RR, and Ratio Revoked RR. The economic perfor-mance 
aim of using three proxies of regional regulation As an interest variable, this study defines 
is to demonstrate comprehensive perspectives of three kinds of proxies for Regional Regulations. 
the impact of regional regulation on economic First, Regional Regulation is measured by the 
growth in sub national level. The regression number of regional regulations in a particular 
results of those proxies estimation are presented province (RR). Second, Regional Regulation is 
measured by the number of regional regulations in Table 1.
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created by the revocation causes hesitation 
among local and foreign investors to invest. As a 
result, lack of investment due to revocation can 
decelerate the local economic performance. 
Furthermore, the significant and negative 
relationship between Ratio Revoked RR and 
GRDP can be seen in Reg 3 in Table 1 and in 
Graph 3 in appendix 1. The negative relation of 
Percent RR and GRDP indicates that when the 
ratio of revoked regional regulation increases in 
particular provinces, the GDP of those provinces 
will decrease. If the number of regional 
regulation increase, the ratio/percentage revoked 
regional regulation to regional regulation will 
decrease. The decreasing of the ratio will lead to 
the increasing of GDP. 
4.1. Regional regulation as one of determining 
variables of economic performance
This section reported the results derived 
Reg 1 in Table 1 shows the results of the first from the empirical model in this study. Three 
regression using the number of regional different techniques consisting of Pooled Least 
regulations as a determinant of regional Square, Fixed Effect and Random Effect were 
economic growth.  This result suggests that the employed to estimate the impact of regional 
number of regional regulation has positive and regulation to economic growth in provincial 
significant impact to GRDP. The positive relation level. The regression results of estimated models 
between GRDP and the number of regulation also are presented in Table 2.
can be seen from the Graph 1 in appendix 1. It Based on the results, from the three proxies 
means that if the number of regional regulation of regional regulations measured, which are RR, 
increases in particular provinces, the GRDP of Revoked RR, and Ratio Revoked RR, only Ratio 
those provinces will increase. The positive effect Revoked RR provided consistent negative 
of regional regulation to GRDP is possible since coefficient, while RR and Revoked RR are 
those regulations set the level of taxes and levies inconsistent. The inconsistency of variable RR 
higher than Central Government does. As a result, arose when random effect was applied. Whereas, 
the revenue of local government from taxes and the inconsistency of variable Revoked RR took 
levies increases, which also increases GRDP. place in the fixed effect regression. Due to the 
The result of regression between GRDP and inconsistency of the two indicators, it can be 
Revoked RR can be seen in Reg 2 in Table 1. It assumed that the variable of Ratio RR is more 
shows that the number of regional regulation has appropriate to represent the regional regulation as 
negative coefficient and significant impact to one of determinants of GRDP.
GRDP. The negative relation between GRDP and Using Ratio Revoked RR as the variable 
the number regulation also can be seen from the interest and applying three techniques of panel 
Graph 2 in Appendix 1. It means that if the estimation, Regression 3 (pooled least square), 
number of revoked regional regulation increases Regression 6 (fixed effect), and Regression 9 
in particular provinces, the GDRP of those (random effect) in Table 2 represents the results of 
provinces will decrease. As explained by Schwark whole model. In order to obtain proper method 
(2009), it can be assumed that the uncertainty analysis to be used, three tests including Chow 
Table 1. The basic relationship 
between three proxies of regional regulation 
and economic performance
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3
RR 0.105**
(0.059)
Revoked RR -0.087**
(0.488)
Ratio Revoked 
RR
-0.482***
(0.185)
Obs 248 248 248
2R 0.0123 0.0128 0.0267
2Adjusted R 0.0083 0.0088 0.0227
F 3.07 3.20 17956.10
Prob>F 0.0812 0.0750 0.0100
***p<0.01, **P<0.05, *p<0.1
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test, Hausman test, and Breusch Pagan Lagrange From the results above, it can be concluded 
Multiplier (LM) test should be conducted. Chow that the appropriate method to be used is fixed 
test is used to determine the desirable method effect method (Regression 6). Nachrowi and 
between pooled least square and fixed effect, Usman (2009) stated that fixed effect is a good 
while Hausman test is applied to decide the method to eliminate the time invariant 
proper method between fixed effect and random unobserved effect.
effect, and Breusch pagan Lagrange Multiplier Regression 6 shows the estimated coefficient 
(LM) test is carried out to determine the of gross capital formation, human capital, and 
appropriate method between pooled least square labor force is significant. However, only gross 
and random effect. The Table 3 presents those capital formation that has positive impact to 
results. GRDP; while human capital and labor force is 
Table 2. Panel data regression results with all variables determining GRDP
Pooled Least Square Fixed Effect Random Effect
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4 Reg 5 Reg 6 Reg 7 Reg 8 Reg 9
Initial GRDP 0.966***
(0.137)
0.960***
(0.013)
0.958***
(0.133)
0.037
(0.435)
0.035
(0.043)
0.041
(0.044)
0.934***
(0.019)
0.929***
(0.109)
0.937***
`(0.019)
Capital 
formation
0.003
(0.005)
0.007
(0.004)
0.008*
(0.004)
0.669***
(0.527)
0.780 ***
(0.0465762)
0.715***
(0.056)
0.015*
(0.009)
0.019*
(0.008)
0.013
(0.019
Human 
Development
-0.00002
(0.0008)
-0.00001
(0.0008)
0.00002
(0.008)
-0.005***
(0.0008)
-0.004***
(0.0008)
-0.005***
(0.0008)
0.0004
(0.001)
0.0003
(0.001)
-0.0005
(0.001)
Labor Force 0.0001
(0.039)
0.001
(0.004)
0.0004
(0.003)
-0.009***
(0.003)
-0.105***
(0.038)
-0.010***
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.004)
-0.0008
(0.004)
0.0002
(0.004)
RR 0.008
(0.011)
0.045**
(0.186)
-0.150
(0.112)
Revoked RR -0.103
(0.008)
0.024*
(0.127)
-0.12
(0.106)
Ratio Revoked 
RR
-0.081***
(0.286)
-0.277
(0.339)
-0.0955***
(0.035)
Obs 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248
R2 0.9973 0.9973 0.9974 0.7300 0.7270 0.7233 0.9971 0.9971 0.9973
Adjusted R2 0.9972 0.9972 0.9973
F 17884.04 17956.01 18435.71 114.63 112.91 110.82
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
***p<0.01, **P<0.05, *p<0.1
Chow test Hausman 
test
Breusch Pagan 
LM test
Selected Model
Pooled Least Square 
or Fixed Effect
Prob=0.0001 Fixed Effect
Fixed Effect or 
Random effect
2Prob>chi  
=0.000
Fixed Effect
Pooled Least Square 
or Random Effect
2Prob>chibar  
= 0.114
Pooled Least 
Square
Table 3. Test results among panel data methods
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negatively affect GRDP.  Regarding the human province if the GRDP of that province is above 
capital, the possible interpretation of that the median or as a poor province if the GRDP is 
negative impact is because the effect of below the median. The rich provinces are 
investment in human capital cannot appear Nangroe Aceh Darussalam, Sumatera Utara, 
instantly, while the income spent in the Sumatera Barat, Sumatera Selatan, Riau, Bangka 
investment process is taken annually (at least Belitung, DKI Jakarta, Jawa Barat, Jawa Timur, 
20% from the total budget). Although in the short Banten, Bali, Kalimantan Barat, Kalimantan 
run human capital has negative effect to GRDP, Tengah, Kalimantan Selatan, Kalimantan Timur, 
the benefits of investment on education are Sulawesi Utara, Papua, and Papua Barat; while 
expected will be acceptance in many years later the poor provinces are Jambi, Bengkulu, 
(Atmanti, 2005). Lampung, DI Yogyakarta, Jawa Tengah, 
There are several possibilities that cause the Sulawesi Tenggara, Sulawesi Tengah, Sulawesi 
negative significant effect of labor force to the Selatan, Nusa Tenggara Timur, Nusa Tenggara 
economic growth. Abdullah (2012) said that the Barat, Maluku, Maluku Utara, and Gorontalo.
employed unskilled labor force (at least two years 
working experience) and the low minimum wage 
gave negative contribution to the economic 
growth. The employed unskilled labor force 
hampers economic growth through the foreign 
investment. Since the level of wage of the 
employed unskilled labor is higher compared to 
the freshman, the production cost is more 
expensive. Another factor that caused negative 
effect of labor force to economic performance is 
the low minimum wage. Because the wage is low, 
the purchasing power of worker also low, 
especially when the high inflation happened. 
Regarding to the insignificant coefficient of 
regional regulation, it can be conclude that there 
is not enough evidence to claim that regional 
regulation (the ratio of revoked regional 
regulation) affect economic performance. 
However, the negative sign of it coefficient is in 
accordance to the argument of legal expert. In this 
case, when the ratio of revoked regional 
regulation to regional regulation increase, which 
mean the number revoked regional regulation is 
relatively higher compare to the number of In the rich provinces, the effect of revoked 
existing regional regulation, it can decrease regional regulation (percentage to regional 
economic development. regulation) on economic growth is negative. It 
means that in the rich provinces, revoked regional 
4.2. The variation effect of regional regulation regulations hamper economic performance. At 
among regions least, there are two possibilities that make 
The effect of the revocation of regional revocation negatively affect economic growth. 
regulation may vary depending on the First, regions tend to disobey the revocation and 
categorization of the GRDP level of those still implement that regulation (related to the tax 
provinces. A province is categorized as a rich and levies). This behavior (collecting 
Table 4. The variation effect of regional 
regulation between provinces
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unauthorized tax and levies) creates uncertainty provide better explanation about the role of 
which increases capital cost and discourages the regional regulation on economic performance.
investors on those regions (Jalilian, Kirkpatrick, After applying several regressions, the 
and Parker, 2006). Furthermore, they argue that estimations show that only one proxy of regional 
politician's interference tends to create regulation is suitable to be analyzed, which is the 
inconsistency by destabilizing the regulations to ratio of revoked regional regulation to regional 
alter them for their own immediate advantage. regulation. Other variables that are used as 
Second, the revocations spread the exertion. In independent variables in this study are initial 
many cases, bad officers charge illegal fees for GRDP, gross capital formation, human capital 
services which actually free or it is charged above index, and labor force, while as dependent 
the actual amount. This behavior may cause high variable is income/GRDP.
economic cost, and then investor will choose Furthermore, this study concluded that the 
other regions which offer lower business cost best method used to estimate the model is fixed 
8 9 10 11(Basri , 2004; Fauzi , 2013; Pri , 2013; Rajasa , effect method based on the results of F-Test, 
2013; Suroso, 2013). It is in line with Jacob's Breusce Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM)-Test, 
study (2004) which concludes that government in and Hausman-Test. The estimation result of fixed 
Asia depend on low quality and low-commitment effect method shows that the estimated 
regulators. coefficients of gross capital formation, human 
In the poor provinces, the effect of revoked capital, and labor force are significant. However, 
regional regulations (percentage to regional only gross capital formation that has positive 
regulation) on economic growth is positive. It impact to GRDP, while human capital and labor 
means that in poor provinces, revoked regional force negatively affect GRDP.  The negative 
regulations promote economic performance. The impact of human capital is caused by the effect of 
governments of poor provinces realize that they investment in human capital that cannot appear 
lack of resources. In order to compete with other instantly, while the income that spent in the 
regions which offer abundant resources to attract investment process is taken annually.
investor, they offer the low cost of doing business The negative significant effect of labor force 
and shorten the bureaucracy. The ease of to GRDP is caused by the employed unskilled 
investing can attract investors, than increase labor force (at least two years working 
economic performance (Basri, 2004). experience) and the low minimum wage 
(Abdullah, 2012). The employed unskilled labor 
force hampers economic growth through the 5. CONCLUSION AND 
foreign investment. Since the level of wage of the RECOMMENDATION
employed unskilled labor is higher compared to This study investigates the impact of 
the freshman, the production cost is more regional regulation on economic performance in 
expensive. Another factor causing negative effect Indonesia by pane data analysis. This study 
of labor force to economic performance is the low utilizes data from 31 provinces in Indonesia over 
minimum wage. Because the wage is low, the 8-years period, from 2002 to 2009. As the interest 
purchasing power of worker is also low, variable, this study uses three proxies of regional 
especially when the high inflation happened.regulation variables which are the number of 
Regarding the insignificant coefficient of regional regulation, the number of revoked 
regional regulation, it can be concluded that there regional regulation, and ratio of the revoked 
is not enough evidence to claim that regional regional regulation to the existing regional 
regulation (the ratio of revoked regional regulation. The aim of using those proxies is to 
8 10Researcher from University of Indonesia. Minister of Researcher from Padjajaran University.
11Finance (now). Former Minister Coordinator of Economy
9 Minister of Home Affairs
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regulation) affects economic growth. However, government, such as: religion, foreign affairs, 
the negative sign of its coefficient is in security and defense, fiscal and monetary policy, 
accordance with the argument of legal expert. and justice. Consequently, most relevant 
When the ratio of revoked regional regulation to variables related to those functions might be 
regional regulation increases or, in other words, invariant across country, for example rule of law, 
the number of revoked regional regulations is foreign debt, exchange rates, and tariffs on trade 
relatively higher than the number of existing (Vidyattama, 2007). In addition to invariant 
regional regulations, the economic performance variables among regions, it is possible that some 
hampers. Generally, the result is in line with variables differ among regions but are not 
Jalilian, Kirkpatrick, and Parker's study (2006) collected consistently for a long period of time 
which mentioned that the ability of the because they are not considered important 
government to provide effective regulatory subject at the sub national level nor are they 
institutions and regulations could be the positive important in a particular period. Examples in this 
factors of the economic development.  case are corruption and conflict. Unfortu-nately, 
In addition to that, by classifying provinces data availability prevented this study to include 
into rich and poor groups, the effect of regional those issues. Finally, we admit that the 
regulation may vary. In rich provinces (provinces relationship between regional regulations and 
with GRDP above the median), the effect of economic growth needs further analysis. 
revoked regional regulation (percentage to However, we believe that this study provides new 
regional regulation) on economic growth is understanding that regional regulations affect 
negative, meaning revoked regional regulation economic growth of poor and rich provinces 
hampers economic performance. Conversely, in differently.    
poor provinces, when the ratio of revoked 
regional regulation increases, their economic 6. REFERENCES
performance also increases.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX 1
GRAPHS OF REGIONAL REGULATION AND GRDP
Graph 1. The relationship between regional regulation and GRDP
Graph 2. The relationship between revoked regional regulation and GRDP
Graph 3. The relationship between ratio of revoked regional regulation to 
regional regulation and GRDP  
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